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Abstract 
After decades of neglect the HIV/AIDS epidemic has rightly become one of the 
highest priorities on the global agenda.  Funding pledges from the donors have 
doubled resource commitments between 2002 and 2004 to over $6 billion.  That 
surge in funding belies the volatile nature of contributions to HIV/AIDS initiatives at 
the country level.  The paper analyzes the impacts of abrupt HIV/AIDS funding on 
macroeconomic stability, fiscal health and the development of health institutions.  
The macroeconomic effects are ambiguous, but depend on the overall level of aid 
flows, as well as those for HIV/AIDS, the management of foreign exchange inflows, 
and effective spending policies.  The fiscal ramifications revolve around the jump in 
external funding that reached around 1000% in Lesotho and Swaziland, and 650% in 
Zambia between 2002 and 2004, and the required rapid scale up if resources are to 
be used productively.  At the same time, the new HIV/AIDS monies are swamping 
public health budgets in some cases exceeding 150% of the government’s total 
allocations for health.  The vertical HIV/AIDS programs and the set aside funding 
threaten to undermine the very institutions that will need to carry forward the long 
term HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment agenda for each country.  Health systems 
are already fragile, and governance problems and uneven productivity compound the 
challenges. Health institutions require funding and attention to strengthen them in 
the fight against HIV/AIDS. 
While the committed funds are desperately needed, solutions to the dilemma will 
require creative options to ensure the flow of funds, manage the economic 
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  3I. Introduction 
 
HIV/AIDS has become the scourge of the times, taking the lives of children and young adults, 
especially women, and leading to dramatic declines in life expectancy. After decades of neglect 
the epidemic has become one of the highest priorities on the global agenda. Prevention through 
behavioral change has proved difficult in many settings and a vaccine remains elusive. The loss 
of a large segment of prime-age adults, particularly women, devastates households, especially in 
the short term. Long-term losses in human capital formation pose a further risk by influencing 
the intergenerational transfer of knowledge and creating macroeconomic threats, particularly in 
the most deeply affected countries of sub-Saharan Africa (Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach, 2004). 
Halting transmission of this highly adaptable virus continues to prove elusive, which means that 
the possibility of an escalation of the epidemic in settings where it has not yet become a 
generalized epidemic remains a serious concern, particularly the Former Soviet Union (notably 
Russia) and South and East Asia. 
 
Though lower prices have reduced, and continue to reduce the cost of treatment, the issue of cost 
is itself dwarfed by the operational challenges of expanding access to treatment, while 
developing and delivering services of sufficient quality and sustainability to avoid unleashing 
new, drug-resistant strains of the virus. Governments face an enormous list of implementation 
challenges whose scale and complexity make prioritization politically, as well as managerially, 
difficult (Ainsworth and Teokul, 2000). 
 
Rapid increases in the funds now available for HIV/AIDS, though long awaited, also raise some 
broader issues. Although the scale of the epidemic, the available domestic resources, and the 
support from the international community differ very substantially across countries, and it is 
necessary to carefully consider the particular circumstances in any country, it is possible to 
identify some key questions: For countries receiving substantial amounts of HIV/AIDS funding, 
can these flows be so large as to have negative effects on macroeconomic stability or fiscal 
management? Can low-income countries effectively utilize the massive amount of resources 
required, or even the amounts already pledged and committed? Institutional capacity and 
governance problems often plague health care systems in developing countries, making 
absorption of new funds problematic. What of other complementary investments that improve 
access to information and services and may prove critical to effective policy? These issues raise 
concerns, and some evidence has emerged recently that sheds light on some of them. This paper 
explores the issues and the evidence and offers a set of actions that can help address some of the 
emerging challenges. 
 
II.   Funding HIV/AIDS Programs 
 
The United Nations Joint Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), along with its co-sponsoring 
members, is leading the effort to define the resource needs for HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment, and ensure adequate financing from public and private sources (UNAIDS, 2004). The 
latest UNAIDS estimates of the costs of a comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS suggest that 
between $9.6 billion and $11.3 billion would be required in low- and middle income countries in 
  42005, rising to between $14.1 billion and $18.8 billion by 2007 (UNAIDS, 2005).
1 These 
numbers relate to total HIV/AIDS-related spending in low-and middle income countries of about 
$6 billion in 2004, including an estimated $3.7 billion from international sources (OECD 2005), 
and about $7 billion allocated annually to overall development assistance (ODA) for health.  
 
Six funding streams support the financing of HIV/AIDS programs: (i) domestic public spending; 
(ii) bilateral assistance; (iii) multilateral agencies such as the World Bank; (iv) the Global Fund 
to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), which is financed by bilateral donors 
and also private foundations, such as the Gates and Clinton Foundations; (v) the private sector, 
including philanthropic donations; and (vi) household out-of-pocket spending. Bilateral 
assistance is projected to grow faster than the other sources, primarily as a result of the 
commitment of $15 billion by the United States for 15 priority countries over five years under 
the President’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The GFATM is anticipated to 
be the second most significant source of funding.  
 
Figure 1 summarizes trends in the resources available for HIV/AIDS. Both the number of 
sources and the levels of commitment show rapid increases, which together are closing in on 
estimated resource needs. Funding is heavily concentrated in a relatively small number of 
countries. Donors are supporting activities in 140 countries, but about 72 percent of this funding 
is allocated to 25 countries, mostly in the highly affected countries in Africa and the Caribbean 
(OECD, 2005). The alignment of allocations and HIV/AIDS prevalence align have resulted in 
rapid growth of funding in those countries. Indeed, concentration of funds is beginning to 
overwhelm health budgets in high HIV/AIDS- incidence countries, as discussed further below.  
 
The rapid inflow of resources puts pressure on countries to effectively absorb new money, often 
in sectors that are institutionally ill-equipped to disburse funds rapidly and effectively. 
Frequently, the primary institutions in charge of implementing HIV/AIDS-related policies or 
measures have neither the authority nor the access to decisionmaking so as to effectively 
integrate their requirements into national policymaking and budget allocation. Spending has been 
halted in a number of countries for a variety of reasons stemming largely from their 
marginalization in policymaking. The pressures on ministries of health are particularly great.  
 
Rapid aid inflows may also imply high donor involvement, particularly where external sources 
provide the bulk of public health funding. In such contexts, donors have shown a penchant for 
off-budget aid and for “vertical” public health programs that attack specific diseases (e.g. TB, 
HIV/AIDS, immunizations) and are divorced from the health system. Both strategies may 
achieve quick results, but bypass orderly budgeting and allocation processes of the government, 
and isolate the investments of donors. Together these contribute to delays in much-needed 
institution building in the health sector.  
 
Within the multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS, ministries of health (MOHs) play a key role, 
retaining direct responsibility for the public health sector, regulating the private health sector, 
and becoming an interlocutor for other sectors that take responsibility for some aspect of 
                                                 
1 The lower estimates reflect estimates of what would be feasible, given actual rates of scale-up on the country level. 
The higher estimates are based on a scenario which envisages rapid investments to overcome existing capacity 
constraints. 
  5HIV/AIDS interventions. Where other ministries for transportation or women take on 
responsibility for addressing the epidemic, the MOH remains a needed partner. Whether the 
HIV/AIDS-related services are implemented by the public sector or the private sector (including 
NGOs), it is important to take into account that these providers draw on the same domestic 
resources, including skilled labor such as physicians, nurses, managers and administrators that 
are typically scarce in low-income countries. Even if the response to HIV/AIDS is in large part 
implemented by the private sector, the public sector will thus need to compete with increasing 
demand in the private sector for the same sets of skills through wage hikes or other incentives 
that make public service attractive.  
 
Note: Figures for private sector only reflect international NGOs. Domestic financing includes public and 
 
he challenge of financing HIV/AIDS is thus two-edged: responding to the level of financial 
elow. 
I.  The Fiscal and Macroeconomic Effects of Increased HIV/AIDS Funding 
he funds to fight HIV/AIDS are needed, adults and children in Africa are dying at the rate of 
7,000 per day for lack of treatment due to the cost of therapies, prevention is lagging, so why are 
Figure 1. 

























private sources but not household spending. 
Source: OECD (2005). 
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requirements, and second, ensuring that the very large amounts of resources being made 





  6large funding responses a problem? The HIV/AIDS community has challenged the notion that 
funds are problematic, arguing that the needs are so great and the resources paltry given the 
magnitude of the problems facing the hardest hit African countries (Burkhalter, 2004; ActionAi
et. al., 2004). However, from the perspective of fiscal or macroeconomic management, the is
is not only the apparent need, but also the overall repercussions on the economy, and the need to 
balance investments that promote growth as well as human capital development, and the 
effectiveness of government spending. Fundamentally it is an issue of using aid so that the funds 
are allocated optimally and the negative externalities minimized. 
 
The strong international response to HIV/AIDS can be seen at the
d 
sue 
 country level in some of the 
ardest hit sub-Saharan African countries. Figure 2 shows the annual trend in external funding 
ll 
 a 
ws between 2000 and 2004 the 
verage level of funding received over 2000-2002 and 2002-2004 is compared for each country 
h
commitments for HIV/AIDS for 9 African countries for the 2000-2004 period. The funding 
comprises bilateral and multilateral commitments as well as those from the GFATM. The overa
trend in resources climbs over the four years for most of the countries (with the exception of
decline in aid for Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique in 2003/04). The dramatic rise between 
2002/03 and 2003/04 for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda – and to a lesser extent, Ethiopia and 
Zambia – can be attributed in part to the launch of the US PEPFAR program in each of the 
countries, which comes on the heels of scale-up efforts by others. 
 
To smooth the trends and compare the net increases in external flo
a
Figure 2.
















































































  7in Figure 3. External funding increased significantly in Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania and 
Zambia, with Tanzania experiencing an almost 400 percent increase and Zambia nearly 700 
percent. Only Kenya saw less than a doubling of aid for HIV/AIDS, and it was the country 
the largest external commitments over 2000-2002. The biggest increases, however, were in th
small countries, Lesotho and Swaziland, that had received only modest flows in the earlier 
period. Funding for each rose by around 1000 percent over 2002-2004.  
 
The sharp increases suggest the need for a rapid scale up in health care ac
with 
e 
tivities to effectively 





lly require some “collateral” domestic resources, such as 
u
implications, but they certainly raise issues of government priority and institutional capacity. O
the macroeconomic side the size of HIV/AIDS flows relative to total aid flows is relevant. 
HIV/AIDS represented between 5 percent and 35 percent of overall aid flows to the 9 countries 
over 2002-2004 (OECD, 2005). These limited proportions suggest that HIV/AIDS funding 
is unlikely to derail overall macroeconomic policy, although it could conceivably exacerbate 
macroeconomic problems associated with large aid flows. However, if overall official 
development assistance (ODA) rises quickly as the result of increased amounts for HIV/AIDS
this could create some policy issues, not only regarding the increased aid flows (an issu
discussed in more detail below), but also regarding the implications for government policy 
priorities and budget allocations.  
 
Because HIV/AIDS monies typica
labor, infrastructure and complementary inputs, and the institutional base to rapidly scale up 
Figure 3. 






































































  8those services, issues of sustainability of funding and the availability of matching public 
S 
nd 
he available evidence on the macroeconomic effects of large aid flows is somewhat ambiguous. 
 appear to play a major role in 
etermining the impacts. Heller and Gupta (2002) use the proposed tripling of ODA to reach the 
AIDS.  
e larger the aid dependence relative to GDP, the greater the vulnerability to unanticipated shifts 
capacity, aid dependence and weak accountability (Heller and Gupta, 2000). 
 
Of these effects, the potential appreciation of the exchange rate and inflationary tendencies are 
closely related. As an illustration, suppose that aid is spent either on domestic services (say, 
doctors) or imported goods (say, drugs). In the former case, the domestic demand for labor rises, 
which will result in an increase in wage rates and thus inflation. At the same time, there is an 
upward pressure on the exchange rate, as the inflow of foreign currency is not offset by a 
corresponding increase in the demand for imports. As a result, there is an excess supply of 
foreign currency (and excess demand for domestic currency), resulting in an appreciation of the 
exchange rate. Alternatively, if the external aid is spent on imported drugs, there is little effect on 
domestic demand (and thus no inflationary impact), and – as the incoming funds are used to 




Thus, large increases in aid have the potential for leading to an appreciated exchange rate and a 
drop in exports, which can compromise economic growth. Between 1995 and 2000 Uganda’s 
ODA grants grew by 3.5 percent of GDP, and despite prudent fiscal management, exchange rate 
appreciation led to dampened exports, a phenomenon known as Dutch disease.
3 Moreover, the 
                                                
resources become major concerns for the government. This applies in particular as HIV/AID
monies are geared towards a few sectors, most notably the health sector, and some of these 
complementary inputs (such as trained health personnel) are limited in the short run.  
 
The following sections outline the evidence surrounding the impact of increasing aid flows a
the implications for macroeconomic, fiscal and health policy. 
 
A.  Macroeconomic Effects of Large Aid Inflows 
 
T
The evidence base is modest, and country circumstances
d
target of .7 percent of OECD’s country as a basis for analyzing the likely macroeconomic and 
fiscal effects of big increases in aid flows. Their results are relevant to the issue of HIV/
 
The macroeconomic effects obviously depend on the size of the economy and on the level of 
imports, with smaller economies being more vulnerable to the external environment. However, 
th
in donor flows. Major macroeconomic risks include appreciation of the exchange rate, 
sustainability of aid flows, inflation and absorptive capacity. The latter stem from inadequate 
 
2 It is important to stress that it should not be concluded from this illustrative example that aid should be spent 
predominantly on imported goods. The ultimate criterion is whether aid is used effectively, and this requires some 
optimal mix of domestic and imported services or goods. Some of the criteria that affect this optimal mix are 
discussed elsewhere in this paper. 
3 The origins of “Dutch disease” emanated from the experience of the Netherlands in the 1960s, when oil was first 
discovered. The sudden infusion of foreign exchange led to an appreciation of the exchange rate and a decline in 
competitiveness and exports.  
  9Central Bank was unable to sterilize adequately to compensate for the foreign exchange 
increases. As a result of this and other factors, growth slowed, at least in the short run.  
 
Based on a theoretical model of aid and public expenditures, Adam and Bevan (2003) analyze a 





from a 4 percentage point increase in aid over a four year period starting in 
984. Despite fiscal surpluses and tight credit policies, inflation remained at around 30 percent 
 
rease in 
id through gross reserve accumulation by the Central Bank. Ghana avoided real exchange rate 
 
 flows 








       
c
for Uganda suggest that an increase in net aid in any sector will lead to a rise in the exchange 
rate, a drop in exports, and a decline in rural incomes in the short run – the classic Dutch dise
effects, but a possible reversal in the long run, so long as aid is not devoted to recurrent 
government expenditures. By contrast, high inflows appear not to have resulted in Dutch disea
problems in Ethiopia, and some recent empirical studies have found inconclusive results b
aid and exchange rate shifts (IMF, 2005a; 2005b). 
 
Regarding the potential effects on inflation, economic theory suggests that the rise in new 
monies leads to an increase in demand for domestic goods and services, driving up prices. Po






More recent experience has demonstrated that the government can mitigate these negative effects
through creative policies. Ghana experienced another surge in aid flows in 2001, which in 
hindsight was a blip rather than the start of an upward trend. This time fiscal policy was 
restrained, and instead of spending the funds the government effectively “saved” the inc
a
appreciation and inflation. Thus the negative effects of sharp, temporary aid increases were 
effectively managed by selling the foreign exchange (so as to sterilize the monetary impact) 
increasing the reserves and continuing a prudent fiscal policy of modest government spending
(Berg, 2005). Berg characterizes this as “aid (mostly) absorbed and not spent” and contrasts this 
with the classic case of “aid absorbed and spent”, as was the case in the 1980s where aid




spending based on aid inflows, thereby making them permanent commitments of governme
(McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001). In the case of HIV/AIDS, the magnitude of the aid is such 
that governments would be hard-pressed to fill the financing gap when aid flows decline. The
experience of aid volatility suggests that governments can overexpose themselves by expanding
public programs when donor funds are available, but are not afforded when the aid funds cease 
causing programs to
The implications of these macroeconomic effects for HIV/AIDS contain some unique elemen
First, the option of saving and not spending the funds in the year of allocation is difficult to 
achieve in cases where funds are effectively earmarked and timely disbursements both expe
and tracked, as is generally the case for HIV/AIDS programs. Besides, putting aside these funds 
                                           
4 A similar result was found for Pakistan using a general equilibrium model (Vos, 1998). 




eliver productivity-enhancing services. That is the subject of the next section. 
 
 
 Dramatic increases have occurred in HIV/AIDS financing, while 








oeconomic concerns with regard to HIV/AIDS. 
mong the most important, given the discussion above, are the level and sustainability of 
pe, 
scaling up the response to HIV/AIDS. But because money is fungible, governments could 
achieve the same outcome if they allocated away from other spending priorities to HIV/AID
substitute for external funds earmarked for HIV/AIDS programs, thereby mitigating infla
pressures. Second, the broader literature on macroeconomic effects of aid suggests that the 
negative short run economic effects can be reversed in the longer run, if aid is invested 
effectively and eventually enhances the productive capacity of the economy. Although 
HIV/AIDS funding is largely earmarked for recurrent expenditures, such as anti-retroviral 
therapy (ART) services, there is a similar effect at play here. As antiretroviral treatment 
improves the health and prolongs the life of those receiving it, HIV/AIDS-related productivity 
losses are mitigated. This, in turn, would offset some of the inflationary pressures associated 
with higher domestic demand. However, this effect requires that the institutions are in pla
effectively d
 
B.  Fiscal Effects of Large Aid Flows 
 
As international concern and empathy have risen, aid funds have followed. Indeed, external 
HIV/AIDS resources are beginning to dwarf public health allocations. Figure 4 shows trends in
domestic public health spending as compared to external aid for HIV/AIDS for the same 9 
countries discussed above. The averages for 2000-2002 and 2002-2004 again rely on averages to
smooth the inter-year changes.
p
actually declined. As a result HIV/AIDS monies exceed overall public health budgets in some 
countries. Over 2002-2004, Ethiopia’s external flows were equal to the government’s health
budget, while in both Uganda and Zambia HIV/AIDS funds exceeded all public health spending 
by almost 185 percent.  
 
The sharp increases between 2000/01 and 2003/04 required rapid changes in the scale and s
of country health services to accommodate the new funds. What is puzzling is how countries can 
accommodate and wisely allocate new resources for HIV/AIDS while their overall health 
spending declines or only modestly rises.  
 
The extent of donor financing goes beyond simply HIV/AIDS financing. In Ethiopia, 
Mozambique and Uganda, overall foreign assistance and loans already accounted for over h
all health spending in 2000/01 (Martin, 2003). A further concern is posed by the fact that
countries such as Uganda, donors already underwrite 70 percent of the government’s health car
budget. When combined with the existing aid component of public health spending, the count
depends almost entirely on external resources and therefore faces sustainability issues where aid
flows fluctuate. 
 
Arguably fiscal issues overshadow the macr
A
external aid, competing demands for scarce resources within the government’s budget envelo
the ability of governments to absorb sharp increases in funding, and the threat of corruption 
where too much money must be spent in too short a time. 
  11 
Sustainability of aid-funded government programs depend on the predictability and constancy of 
annual allocations. Predictable aid levels allow governments to act in the interests of medium to 
long term objectives such as the MDGs, and permits a systematic scale up of government effort 
to specifically address bottlenecks. The greater the dependence on foreign assistance, the more 
vulnerable public programs are to the certainty of donor funds. Recent evidence suggests the 
highly volatile and unpredictable nature of aid. A study of 72 countries found that over time, 
volatility in aid flows exceeds that in tax revenues, and tends to be pro-cyclical, rising and falling 
with government budgets (Bulir and Hamann, 2003). Average volatility of aid is about 40 times 
that of revenue, and despite efforts at improvements has increased in the 2000-2003 period 
compared with 1995-1999 (Bulir and Hamann, 2005).  
 
Predictability of aid, as measured by the difference between commitments and disbursements, 
performs unevenly but on balance is negatively correlated with development. Countries on the 
upper half of the income scale generally receive promised resources, but the poorest countries 
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Long term strategies are compromised by erratic funding, and prudent public management 
becomes difficult. The lack of certainty restrains efforts to scale up in response to international 
goals, and prudent government policy should shun an agenda that entail long term investments 
reliant on external funding, given the limited prospects for even short term predictability in 
donor funds. Developing countries’ responses, however, are mixed. 
 
HIV/AIDS initiatives will be particularly affected by both the volatility and unpredictability of 
funding. First, any scale up in services will require additional hiring. With uncertain flows, 
expanding the civil service borders on folly given inflexible public sector labor markets, and 
particularly the inability to downsize when funding contracts or priorities shift (Over, 2004). 
Second, countries must rely on imported drugs for HIV/AIDS patients. If the resources or in-kind 
donations dry up, the government would need to take responsibility for funding, or else the life-
saving treatments would cease. This has serious budgetary implications for low income 
countries, and heighten the competition among sectors for funding. A final HIV/AIDS-specific 
challenge is the need to maintain treatment levels. As a chronic disease dependent on continued 
therapy for survival, interruptions in ART treatment due to funding gaps reduce the benefits of 
treatment, and more alarmingly, can lead to the development of resistant strains of the virus, 
thereby compromising everyone’s access to treatment (Over et. al., 2004).  
 
Historical patterns in donor support suggest the need for cautious scale up in the face of donor 
promises, particularly in the medium term. Until some certainty can be assured, governments 
may be unduly exposing themselves and HIV/AIDS patients to serious setbacks. Given the size 
of pledges over the next few years, these concerns are indeed for the medium term. Donor 
fatigue at continued support for a life-long chronic disease or faltering donor funding for other 
reasons would undermine the progress and doom patients who were initially offered treatment 
and survival under the program. Withdrawing financial support would undermine HIV/AIDS 
programs in the small, low income recipient countries that could not possibly increase spending 
for a health program that represents more than half of existing spending in the sector. 
 
HIV/AIDS affects the economy and the population in devastating ways, but it is only one of 
nd 
any public responsibilities. 
e 
s 
many critical elements in the planning and budgeting of governments. HIV/AIDS programs 
effectively compete with education, infrastructure and other health investments, among other 
public functions, for a fixed amount of resources, both human and financial. Public spending on 
HIV/AIDS means less for other investments, some of which have a direct, positive effect on 
HIV/AIDS prevention or on ensuring effective treatment for HIV/AIDS patients. For example, 
education plays a major role in helping girls and women avoid infection (DeWalque, 2004), a
infrastructure (e.g., roads, electricity) raises productivity and improves mobility and 
effectiveness of human resources, drugs and patients. Hence governments must balance 
priorities, keep the economy and the government functioning and address special issues like 
HIV/AIDS. Fiscal management cannot grind to a halt in the interest of any event short of nuclear 
evastation. While serious, HIV/AIDS remains one of m d
 
Bevan (2005) has pointed out two additional fiscal concerns with large increases in aid. First, th
rise of aid dependency and the abrogation of government capacity to generate domestic revenue
(a moral hazard problem), and second the danger that corruption will be induced. The former 






 sharp rise in funding 






stitutions and regulatory policies, elevated corruption and poor governance can lead to sharply 
finance government programs. It suggests the need for domestic matching funds, compleme
initiatives from government, strengthened institutions, and containment of program creep where
funding cannot be guaranteed and. The second is commensurate with the behavior patterns 
observed with large inflows from natural resource booms, which fuel corruption and reduced
investments in mainstream needs (Leite and Weidman, 1999).  
 
Both reduced incentives for raising national funds, and the threat of corruption apply in the 
HIV/AIDS context. Money is fungible, and the more external assistance there is for HIV/AI
programs the more likely are shifts in domestic resource allocation away from HIV/AIDS-
specific investments and towards country priorities with less donor interest. This leaves the 
country vulnerable in the event of lessened donor commitment since government investments 
have shifted to other programs that are also likely to need continued financing. Reducing aid 
volatility and predictability offer a starting point for mitigating the undesirable shift in re
Other options need to be explored that offer governments greater flexibility in spending and 
allocating resources that reverse the disincentives for revenue raising and resource allocation 
away from a priority as serious as HIV/AIDS. 
 
Corruption remains a potential problem in the HIV/AIDS context due to the
a
exacerbate the likelihood of corruption, both in not overcoming obstacles, and in poor or 
negligible oversight and enforcement. Strengthened institutions accompanied by better 
accountability arrangements can help to blunt the likelihood of corruption. However, the 
fungibility of resources makes the diversion of funds harder to discern and control. Instituti
play a central role in ensuring the adequate use and benefit of aid flows. The next section takes 
up this topic, as it has implications for all aspects of HIV/AIDS funding and program 
implementation.  
 
IV.  Institutional Issues in HIV/AIDS Spending Increases  
 
Good institutions underpin effective policies, including macroeconomic and fiscal policy (Be
2005; Bevan, 2005).
5 They also contribute to whether and how well government can deliver 
services. Simply having good intentions and the right priorities does not guarantee effective 
programs. It requires the necessary leadership, management, staffing and infrastructure to 
translate donor resources into programs that produce the intended outcomes of reducing the 
spread of HIV, treating those already infected and managing the burgeoning number of orphans
Institutions are woefully weak in much of Africa, and that extends to ministries of health whose 
expertise in management and finance is often limited. 
 
The IMF and World Bank (2004), in their paper for the Development Committee, have noted
that accelerating progress toward the MDGs will require a combination of good policies, 
institutional strengthening and additional support from donors. They observe that “w
in
                                                 
5 Bevan (2005) notes that specific constraints often reflect a generalized lack of capacity in low income countries, 
and that absorptive capacity constraints, while they have macroeconomic implications, are largely sectoral and fiscal 
phenomena, and need to be addressed accordingly.  
  14diminishing returns to aid. Quality of governance and institutions is most critical in using aid to 
accelerate progress toward the MDGs.” While the scope of their study is broader, these 
admonitions apply to the health sector and to HIV/AIDS programs. 
 
These three factors – institutions, governance and upgrading capacity – play important roles in
determining whether additional funds for HIV/AIDS can be effe
 
ctively absorbed. What is risky 






l absorption of aid (Sundberg, Lofgren and 






alth sector. These same constraints confront expansion of HIV/AIDS services 
hether they are stand alone programs or integrated with the overall health care delivery system. 
or HIV/AIDS treatment, which 




unding represents an essential but insufficient element in scaling up to fight HIV/AIDS.  
 
oversight (Curran et. al., 2004; Oliveira-Cruz, Hanson and Mills, 2003; Munishi, 2003; Lewis, 
is
once external funding becomes available. Where delays occur due to lack of any critical inpu
(e.g., staffing, infrastructure, management, warehousing, logistics), productivity is reduced and 
impact falters.
6 The infrastructure may be available, the staffing complete but a missing inp
leaves programs unable to be productive. Curran et. al. (2004) record USAID experience wit
infrastructure in place but inadequate human resources to man clinics and health posts. Scaling
up availability of infrastructure (roads, power, water supply, etc.), skills and other factors need
to absorb funds will be essential to producing positive returns.  
 
Recent simulation evidence for Ethiopia suggests the importance of infrastructure and human 
capital in raising growth and allowing additiona
B
initial infrastructure investments to support productivity gains in public service delivery, which 
in turn will raise growth, household incomes and public revenues. Combined with additiona
investments in education to permit the scale up in skilled workers, aid investments can the
absorbed effectively. The need for early emphasis on education to build expanded health
capacity is echoed by Curran et.al. (2004) in their analysis of treatment needs for HIV/AID
Africa. 
 
Mills and Hanson (2003) identify and explore the constraints to scaling up to absorb in
funding for the he
w
If the public sector is to adequately meet the expanding demand f
n
will need to be confronted: (i) infrastructure; (ii) hiring, training and retaining staff; (iii) 
upgraded logistics for drugs and supplies; (iv) improved information generation to meet dono
requirements; and, (v) governance reforms. In many respects governance reforms – improvin
efficiency, performance and impact – captures the set of actions needed to ensure progress 
these constraints. 
 
A.  Nature of Governance Issues in Health.  
 
F
Countries need the capacity to manage, spend, and monitor additional donor inflows (Haacker,
2004b), despite facing significant institutional and governance constraints in doing so 
(Kumaranayake and Watts, 2001; Mills and Hanson, 2003). Institutions in the poorest 
developing countries, especially those in the health sector, reveal gaps in basic management and 
                                                 
6 For example, imported drugs that expire on the wharf due to lack of trucks to transport products to warehouses 
render ARV treatment programs useless and a waste of scarce resources. 
  15LaForgia and Sulvetta, 1997). Inadequate capacity translates into low efficiency and 
effectiveness of spending, and the lack of accountability means that poor performance go





alth workers to migration, 




rious forums. We focus here on the institutional constraints, specifically on the nature of 




r education ever reached the schools, a situation not unique to the education 
ctor, and suggestive of systemic problems (Dehn, Reinikka and Svensson, 2003).
7 A recent 
y health care clinics in non–HIV/AIDS 




                                                
 
Human resources represent over half the cost of health care, even in the industrialized countries
In lower income countries, it can reach 90 percent of health spending. The HIV/AIDS crisis 
affects the supply of health care providers, as they too are affected by the epidemic. HIV/AID
incidence adds costs through absenteeism of health care workers who are too ill to come to wor
their use of medical and death-related benefits, and the costs of hiring and training replacement 
staff for those who die. Evidence from Malawi shows annual absenteeism at 65 days for those 
with full-blown HIV/AIDS, and 15 days for those with HIV (Haacker, 2004b). Another factor 
that adds to the problem of inadequate human resources is that of sharply increased migration 
among health workers to other countries, reducing availability at a time when demand is on the 
rise. However, while sub-Saharan Africa as a whole is losing he
c
thus mitigating the losses from brain drain in the receiving countries of Africa. 
 
In Africa staffing constraints pose a major challenge both because of the limited supply and 
because of the accelerating out-migration of trained health workers (Chen, Evans and Anand, 
2004; Joint Learning Initiative, 2004). Supply of trained workers is obviously highly inelastic
(unresponsive) given the lead time needed to bring them up to required skill levels (Over, 2004)
Management needs face similar restrictions, and are probably the single most important set of 




Poor governance – including corruption, and weak financial and personnel management in public
health systems – adds to costs and lowers the productivity of existing staff (Kaufmann, Kray and 
Zoido-Lobatón 1999). Household surveys show that in some countries, patients are often 
required to provide under-the-table payoffs to health workers for treatment at public clinics, a 
violation of free health care mandates and a direct payment to public servants (Lewis, 
forthcoming; Munishi, 2003; Thompson, 2004). An exercise in tracking public funds from 
ministries of finance showed that local capture, leakage, and bureaucratic impediments prevente
resources from reaching the front line in many African countries. In Uganda, only 13 percent o
capitation grants fo
se
multi-country study recorded absenteeism at primar
a
survey found that absenteeism among physicians averaged 35 percent, reaching 74 percent 
larger clinics (Chaudhury and Hammer, 2004). An earlier study in a major public hospital in the
Dominican Republic could account for only 12 percent of physician time over a two-w
 
7 Subsequent action of reporting budget amounts in local newspapers and posting transfer amounts on schoolhouse 
doors have remedied the situation (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). 
  16(Lewis, La Forgia and Sulvetta, 1997) These governance challenges bring into questio
of simply increasing staffing.
n the value 












HIV/AIDS programs are vertical, stand alone initiatives they remain part of the broader public 




community (Burkhalter, 2004) have as much to do with limitations of government management 
as they do with external pressures from the international financial institutions to limit hiring. 
working conditions of civil servants where there are missing supplies and drugs, few 
opportunities for advancement, and poor management have as much to do with low morale and 
out-migration as simply low pay (Curran et. al., 2004). Zimbabwe offers a case in point. Prior to
the disintegration of the health system the well run civil service retained workers, including tho
in the health sector. With deteriorating working conditions, eroding management and political 
and economic uncertainty, the higher salaries and better management outside the country becom
attractive options. Reforming civil service systems is complex and difficult and a responsibility 
outside of the Ministry of Health but is a key component of good governance and a critical 
ingredient in the scale up for HIV/AIDS. 
 
A
poorly designed or under-resourced treatment programs that lead to low levels of adherence t
complex treatment regimes. If drugs are not administered according to strict protocols, resistan
strains of the virus can develop, jeopardizing treatment options for all (Over et. al., 2004). Som
degree of chaos and a period of adjustment generally accompany major expansions or shifts of 
service delivery in scaling up. Anti-retroviral treatment (ART) services would be no exception,
but the ability of the virus to constantly mutate and adapt to changing circumstances, and the 
public good nature of minimizing resistant strains suggest the need for particular care and 
attention to protocols and ART management.  
 
Expanding the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS must focus on better management at all 
levels, financial oversight, and accountability of public spending, which can both increase and 
improve service delivery through addressing issues such as staff absenteeism and producti
and financial leakages and irregularities. Otherwise the government will be hard pressed to 
effectively absorb expanded funding. 
 
B.  Building Health Institutions.  
 
Absorbing more funding fundamentally means bolstering the health care delivery system. 
Building capacity and institutions must accompany large scale ups in aid to improve both aid 
effectiveness and marginal returns of a given level of aid (absorptive capacity). That means 
strengthening the public entities that deliver health care. Donor penchant for vertical program
that allow countries to place “flags in the sand” undermine governments’ ability to develop an 
integrated, functioning system for health care delivery. HIV/AIDS programs already rely on the 
existing infrastructure of physical and human capital directly and indirectly. Even where 
 
8 The oversupply of physicians in countries like Egypt and Pakistan have not translated into more effective or 
accessible health care services, suggesting that more than just hiring additional staff will be needed to improve 
performance in the health sector.  
 
  17health delivery efforts since diagnosis, referrals and treatment of opportunistic infections as well 
as side effects of ART continue to be provided by the health system. In sub-Saharan Africa 
etween 40-70 percent of hospitals beds in some countries were filled by patients with 
uxin, 
 
e priority programs in the overall health program, 
ragments outreach, raises the demand for management skills that are already in short supply, 
itutions in the health sector that need to support 
IV/AIDS scale up. In addition, the governance issues deserve more attention since poor 
 recent IMF policy document notes that “under the PRSP approach, countries with sound 
erty xpenditure management systems should benefit from 





limits options. The question is how to address public sector management and institution building 
d to 
b
HIV/AIDS-related illnesses (Over, 2004).  
 
Separating HIV/AIDS from the overall health care delivery system is both inefficient and 
clinically ill-advised. Both the recent Millennium Project Task Force on HIV/AIDS (R
Binagwaho and Wilson, 2005) and WHO’s Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 
Working Group 5 (Mills and Hanson, 2003) have emphasized the imperative of upgrading health 
care systems to cope with the prevention and treatment for HIV/AIDS as well as other vertical 
programs. HIV/AIDS services are part and parcel of the health care delivery system’s services.
Vertical and integrated health programs must be complementary, and over the longer term 
programs like HIV/AIDS need to be absorbed by the health system (Oliveira-Cruz, Kurowski 
and Mills, 2003). Focusing solely on vertical initiatives to deliver preventive and treatment 
services misses the opportunity to integrat
f
and bleeds the health system of financial and human resources to set up a parallel delivery 
operation. Vertical programs often reflect a desire for a short term fix, but results in a costly 
approach that weakens the health system overall. 
 
In short, vertical programs, while easier for donors to manage and monitor, are at odds with 
efforts to build sound institutions, the cornerstones of development. 
 
Institutional issues have played a limited role in the concerns over HIV/AIDS, but the 
preliminary evidence suggests that it is the inst
H
governance, the attendant corruption, and low productivity make progress in HIV/AIDS 
outcomes difficult to achieve. 
 
V.  Emerging Challenges for HIV/AIDS Spending.  
 
A
pov  reduction strategies and public e
h
philanthropic organizations. It further specifies that these increased aid flows can be 
accommodated “where they can be spent productively without undermining macroeconomic 
stability and/or fiscal and external debt sustainability,” and that “consideration will need to b
given to whether there is sufficient absorptive capacity in the economy, as well as administrativ
capacity within the government to accommodate these flows” (IMF, 2003).  
 
This policy highlights the importance of a particular health issue and places responsibility
how much to spend, and on what, to governments. While appropriate, the HIV/AIDS crisis often
objectives within the context of urgent pressure to spend to save lives. Recent experience in 
Zambia and Uganda offer telling examples of the challenges facing governments, and the nee
view HIV/AIDS within the broader context of macroeconomic, fiscal and institutional pressures. 
  18 
The IMF’s decisionmaking procedures and spending restrictions are often criticized as hostil
promoting investments in social sectors such as health and education (Burkhalter, 2004)
country circumstances and actions are often
e to 
. But 
 more complicated than they appear. The attached 





crisis. Rising resource needs for HIV/AIDS coincided with a realization that the governme
overextended. Scale-up efforts to cope with the rising tide of funds for the disease were direc
affected. Severe austerity measures, framed with the assistance of the IMF and World Bank
became necessary to restore fiscal order. The crisis could have been avoided if there had been 
transparency in government finances and prudent budgetary allocations. Another lesson that 
emerged was the need for ministries of health to act proactively in close coordination with 
ministries of finance, planning programs along with their financing. 
 
Zambia: Government Policy, the IFIs and the Fight against HIV/AIDS 
 
The Zambian HIV/AIDS epidemic has contributed to government woes as it saps the civil 
service, raises cost of health care with HIV and opportunistic infections (OI) care, and leaves 
large numbers of orphans in its wake. With 16 percent of the population and 30 percent of 
pregnant women diagnosed as HIV positive (Central Statistical Office Zambia, et. al., 2003) 
there is no doubt that Zambia faces a crisis. HIV/AIDS is estimated to have reduced annual 
economic growth by one percent per year as the epidemic has spread unchecked. Efforts to scale 
up HIV/AIDS spending have met a series of setbacks. 
 
Zambia’s economic growth has averaged more than 4 percent in last five years. Although this is 
not fast enough to reduce poverty in line with the MDGs, it represents a sharp improvement over 
a decade of 1.4 percent annual growth and declining per capita income (World Bank, 2004b). 
Progress has been made towards macroeconomic stability. However, wage increases in the 
public sector have increasingly been a source of pressure on the fiscal deficit and hence domestic 
borrowing and interest rates. Government spending on civil service salaries increased from 5.4 
percent of GDP in 1999 to 8.0 percent in 2002. 
  
In 2003, the government granted wage increases and related allowances that would have 
increased the wage bill to over 10 percent of the GDP—a wage bill Zambia could ill-afford and 
well out of line with sound international practice and affordable government (see graph). 
Generous pension and separation obligations, which cost roughly 12 years of salary per 
retrenchment (World Bank 2004c), led ministries to delay retirements, instead keeping existing 
staff on the payroll and hiring more. All government bodies hired with impunity, without the 
knowledge of the Ministry of Finance, ignoring all rules about hiring and salaries. No records of 
the hiring were maintained, and “ghost workers” proliferated.  
 
The large projected budget overrun threw fiscal policy into disarray precluding a new three-year 
PRGF arrangement, after the last PRGF arrangement expired in March 2003. An IMF staff-
monitored program (which entails an understanding on macroeconomic policies between the 
government and the IMF, but does not include any lending by the IMF), which was extended to 
June 2004, served to bring policies back on track for a new PRGF arrangement. These  
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developments delayed progress toward HIPC completion. It also required the government to 
renegotiate agreements with public employee unions to bring public spending under control. A 
Dutch grant for retrenchment costs also allowed the government to shed 7,000 civil servants. 
 
With assistance from the World Bank and the IMF, Zambia has sought to frame a solution that 
could: (i) meet macroeconomic priorities; (ii) address the challenges of governance, public 
expenditure management, and financial accountability; and (iii) ensure that public staffing needs 
are met, especially in education and health. The newly agreed PRGF specifically addresses 
staffing issues, supporting limits in the total wage bill that maintains overall public sector 
staffing costs at 8 percent of GDP, without putting limits on hiring. Recent retirements and 
retrenchments will permit hiring increases, but the rules and priorities regarding how many to 
hire, and in which sectors, are left to the Zambian government. The World Bank has specifically 
noted the need to increase efforts and spending on prevention and treatment for HIV/AIDS 
(World Bank, 2004b). 
 
An alternative scenario emerged in Uganda where significant inflows for HIV/AIDS crea
difficulties for the Central Bank due to their level of domestic, rather than international, debt. 
The Bank of Uganda characterized the free money as “too costly to absorb” (Obwona 2004). Th
government froze the 2002/03 budget for the Ministry of Health, instructing it to “turn down 
funding from overseas donors that do not fall within the government’s priorities.” (Wendo, 
002). In this instance, the constraint was not one of absorptive capacit
ted 
e 
y, the requirements of 
nds 
2
sound monetary policy, without controlling government spending they would undermine their 
ability to control the money supply. Moreover, because it was left out of the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) that defines the government’s fiscal priorities counterpart fu
were not available. Effectively the government took a stand to protect the economy and the 
discipline of sound fiscal management.  
 
  20In both countries, the ultimate decision lay with government policy-making and action. In 
 on the parameters of national spending, which had a direct effect 
on the use of HIV/AIDS funds, but neither institution actually prescribed government actions, 
and neither they nor the government were able to effectively prevent the undesirable outcomes. 
 
Because evidence is mixed, governments must rely on good practice, observe other policies and 
their outcomes, and pay attention not only to the macroeconomic and fiscal concerns, but to the 
institutional issues that are so central to effective public programs. The two cases here present 
very different policies and actions, but both are instructive on the pitfalls and processes needed to 
both manage an economy and address a devastating disease that is claiming lives and 
compromising countries’ futures. 
 
VI. Policy Implications and Recommendations  
  
The international donor community’s largesse comes in response to alarms rung by UNAIDS 
and others who have seen firsthand the devastation of the disease. Billions of dollars have been 
 now is to ensure that the monies can be used and absorbed effectively, 






anaged, big annual disbursements could be made more 
adily by donors, and productivity and impact could be enhanced in the process. 





Large amounts of financing and first rate advice can achieve little unless countries themselves 
choose to take charge. The World Bank, IMF, bilateral donors and other players in the end can
only provide support to what must be government policy, commitment, and action. This remains 
the fundamental component of effective interventions and satisfactory outcomes, for countries, 
IFIs, and other public and private donors. With that as background, this section lays out the 
implications of the above discussion, and suggests areas for further action by donors and 
governments who are directly involved as partners in the overall effort.  
 
Although the donors and the IFIs have realized the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS problem, and 
while they acknowledge the imperative to do more on both prevention and treatment, they face
challenges in reconciling these needs with prudent macroeconomic and fiscal policies. In seeking 
acceptable solutions at least some of the government spending constraints can be addressed 
through innovative opti
 
First, since funding flows are erratic and likely to be concentrated across a relatively short 
period, the sustainability of funding could be ensured through establishment of a special 
HIV/AIDS Stabilization Fund that would receive HIV/AIDS contributions from donors and other 
institutions. In effect it would be “absorbing” aid and allowing its spending over time (in the 
terms of Berg, 2005). It would imitate the sequestered funds from natural resource earnings 
use special funds to help manage revenue windfalls to ensure their sensible use. If reported 
transparently and managed appropriately such a fund would address the some of the 
macroeconomic, fiscal and governance problems that abrupt, large inflows can imply. Count
could then absorb all dedicated funding for HIV/AIDS and make available the necessary 
resources for prevention and treatment programs for HIV/AIDS. The terms of trade and 
exchange rate problems could be better m
re
  21 
Given the chronic nature of HIV/AIDS and the need to maintain ARV treatment over the life 
span of patients, extending funding over a longer period and arranging funding in line with 
capacity would strengthen a country’s ability to manage external flows, allow them to scale up at 




on in this instance to help countries manage their HIV/AIDS 
flows sustainability. 








the Millennium Task 
Force Report on HIV/AIDS (Ruxin, Binagwaho and Wilson, 2005) propose greater reliance on 
ining or integrate tasks drawing on the comparative advantage of 








countries like Azerbaijan, and Norway in handling sudden increases in oil revenues, similar to 
the surge in HIV/AIDS funds, are instructive. These countries sequestered oil revenues in special
funds to better manage their financial resources and prevent a flood of spending that would hav
undermine good fiscal management. Botswana’s experience with putting aside diamond earnings 
is another example. The IFIs already have experience in assisting governments in unde




upgrading of the health care system. This is a cost donors have been reluctant to underwrite, ev
though the bulk of the new monies would need to rely on the health system to be effective. Such
a tax would spread the cost of scaling up among donors and ensure that governments alone were 




Third, delivery of prevention and treatment should expand beyond simply the government. This
does not suggest that government abrogate its responsibilities, but that government continue to 
coordinate and to find innovative means of service delivery. The model in Haiti of minimally 
trained outreach workers reaching low income communities combines highly technical 
management and oversight that bolsters the functions of lower level workers (Farmer et. a
2001). The Joint Learning Initiative (Chen, Evans and Anand, 2004) and 
NGOs in delivery and recent evaluations in Africa suggest the cost effectiveness of NGOs in 
service delivery (Reinikka and Svensson, 2003). Hiring temporary workers for government 
programs offers a short term flexible option, although this may require government-wide 
sponsorship and agreement. It should be a component of governance reforms. Having 
government sponsor joint tra
d
severity of the problem, multiple solutions will be essential.  
 
Fourth, governments need to address the governance problems impeding progress in public 
service delivery. While a point that goes much beyond the response to HIV/AIDS, it remains 
crucial component for effective HIV/AIDS efforts. These actions are as important as the sectoral-
specific proposals above and will have an equally important influence on the effectiveness o
HIV/AIDS and other health delivery tasks. Civil service reform, budget management 
and greater accountability for policies, programs and fiduciary functions deserve attention, and 
are critical to effective scaling up in health and HIV/AIDS. As part of the objective of pro
better governance, is the responsibility to better understand ways to ensure accountability
entails incorporating sound evaluations to guide program adjustments and future endeavors. 
Encouraging innovative approaches such as day beds in clinics; assistance with co
  22ancillary and direct service provision; issuing vouchers for HIV/AIDS patients (which provides 
e 
 agenda of budget management, public sector reform, and the interface 
ith the health sector. Building on its experience with HIV/AIDS programs, the Bank should 
n on 
an added benefit if health care workers are allowed to cash them in for remuneration because 
providers then have an incentive to make sure the drug and supply logistics function), and th
use of supervised paraprofessionals all offer ways to improve delivery while husbanding scarce 
resources. Part of governance reforms should address these kinds of performance and 
productivity enhancing initiatives. 
  
Finally, the World Bank needs to do more. The institution is unique in its ability to work across 
the governments with ministries of finance, health and economy. Acceptable solutions to the 
myriad of sectoral and systemic issues outlined above require broad understanding and action 
across government. The World Bank has a comparative advantage, relative to other institutions, 
in taking on the broader
w
continue to contribute resources, but also help to focus both borrower and donor attentio
easing the administrative and capacity constraints that slow disbursements from all sources. For 
example, the Bank could serve as honest broker in discussions between ministries of finance and 
health to persuade the former to fund health care or accept donor funds, and the latter to give 
priority to financing and performance issues.  
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